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Michelle Obama:
A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender
Discrimination through the Lens of Title VII
Gregory S. Parkst & Quinetta M. Robersont *
"Meet the new political wife. She has a career; she has
opInIOns
a partner in every way .... And now, she's become
controversial. "
Ted Koppel 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 presidential campaign is historic given the presence of a
Black candidate (Barack Obama) and a woman candidate (Hillary Clinton).
Not only is it historic that Americans had a real opportunity to elect the
first Black or woman president, it is also the first time that Americans are
Michelle Obama.
faced with the prospect of having a Black First Lady
As such, the presidential campaign provides a useful context in which to
analyze how race and gender attitudes influence voting behavior. 2 Even
Senator Clinton analogized the 2008 presidential election campaign to a
hiring decision in the employment context. 3 Underlying this analogy is the

t Law Clerk, u.s. Dislrict Cotnt for the Dislrict of Maryland (2{)()9..201O); Law Clerk, Dislrict of
Columbia Cotnt of Appeals (2008-2009). B.S., Howard University; M.S., City University of New YOlk;
MA, Ph.D., University of Kentucky; J.D., Corneu Law School.
:t Professor, Villanova School of Business. B.S., University of Delaware; M.B.A, University of
Pittsburgh; Ph.D., University of Maryland
The authors thank Rebecca Soquier for her tireless work editing and BlueBooking this
article. We also thank Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski for his input on early drafts of this article. All
errors are the authors',
* Although the 200S Presidential election has passed, this article continues to uses "Senator
Ohama" when referring to now President-elect Ohama as this analysis is focused on his candidacy, not his
actions as or society's perception ofrum as President-elect - &is.
1. Joan Vennochi, Op-Ed, A Delicate line for Michelle Obama, B. GWBE, March 2, 2OOS, at D9
(quoting Ted Koppel's reference to First Lady Hillary Clinton).
2. See generally GregO!}' S. ParlG & Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of
Unconscious Race and Gender Bias in the 200S Presidential Race 37-40 (Cornell Legal Stud. Research,
Paper No. OS.()()7), available at http://papers.ssm.comIso13lpapers.cfin? abstracUd= 11 02704.
3. Jim Acosta et a1., Clinton: IhinkAbout IhisasaHiringDedsion, CNN.COMPouncs,May IS,
2008, http://www.cnn.comI2008lPOUTICSI05/181campaign.wrap! index.htmL
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

3

4

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[VoL 20:1

notion that voters stand in the shoes of employers, and candidates stand in
the shoes of prospective employees. Thus, the same principles and modes
of analysis that apply to employment discrimination may apply to voting
behavior. If it is apropos to analogize elections to hiring decisions, new
frontiers in employment discrimination law that involve the intersection of
race and gender, 4 the role of implicit bias, 5 and third-party associative
discrimination 6 are implicated. In essence, the Title VII framework
provides a template for how certain aspects of the 2008 Presidential
election can be understood. Here, we focus on the role of Michelle Obama.
If voters harbored race stereotypes and biases about Senator Obama,
and if voters harbored gender stereotypes and biases about Senator Clinton
during her campaign, then it is reasonable to believe that both types of
preconceptions may have influenced voters' perceptions about Mrs.
Obama. Some researchers have proposed models that describe the role of
First Ladies. 7 Gladys Lang offered a model of status based upon a
woman's relationship with her spouse. According to that model, women
may possess one of the following types of status: I) satellite status, which
implies that a woman defines herself through her spouse and possesses no
independent ideas; 2) sponsored status, which implies that a woman
achieves recognition by her relationship with a prominent spouse; or 3)
autonomous status, which implies that a woman's conferred recognition is
based on her own ideas and actions independent of her spouse. 8 Watson
presents a similar typology (specific to First Ladies) categorizing the wives
on a continuum from non-partners to full partners based on their
relationships with their husbands. 9 He argues that only Eleanor Roosevelt,
Rosalyn Carter, and Hillary Clinton, have achieved full partnership based
on their professionalization, integration into the political agenda, and
activism. 10 While such spousal roles have earned these First Ladies
4. See Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982); Payne v.
Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558
F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.
1976); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carswell v.
Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 365,371-381 (1991).
5. See Section III infra on Implicit Bias and VoterfEmployment Discrimination.
6. See Section IV infra on Third-Party Standing and VoterfEmployment
Discrimination.
7. See HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN tN THE MAss MEDIA (Gaye Tuchman
et al. eds., 1978).
8. Gladys Engel Lang, The Most Admired Woman: Image-making in the News, in
HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MAss MEDIA 147 (Gaye Tuchman et al. eds.,
1978).
9. R. P. WATSON, THE PRESIDENT'S WIVES: REASSESSING THE OFFICE OF THE FIRST
LADY 1-10 (1999).
10. Id. at 6.
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acclaim for their knowledge of, and involvement in, the political agenda,
these women have also received the most criticism for their roles as "copresidents." I I That is, until now.
Michelle Obama, wife of President-elect, Senator Barack Obama,
contravenes conventional stereotypes of presidential candidates' wives.
First, she has been direct and plain spoken
described as "tough, and
even a little steely.,,12 In February of 2008, Republicans branded her as
unpatriotic. 13 The critique stemmed from her comment during a discussion
of the level of political engagement she was witnessing among Americans:
"For the first time in my adult lifetime, I am really proud of my country." 14
Second, when asked about what role she saw for herself as the potential
First Lady, she noted that work-family balance would be one of her top
priorities. 15 This is not surprising given that she seems concerned about
empowering women. Speaking of that broader concern, during a speech
she gave in Las Vegas, she noted, "We sat back too long, suffering in
silence, avoiding these challenges. We can't do that any longer. We need
a man," stopping to correct herself, "a person who happens to be a man,
who is ready to help us turn the page to bring a new conversation to the
table, to change the lives of women and children across America." I 6
Mrs. Obama also was not shy about expressing her views on race
issues. At Princeton, Mrs. Obama was interested in social change and ran a
literacy program for local neighborhood children. 17 She also wrote her
senior sociology thesis on "Princeton-Educated Blacks and the Black
Community.,,'8 In it she wrote, "[Princeton] made me far more aware of
my 'blackness' than ever before.,,19 She went on to write, "Regardless of
the circumstances under which 1 interact with Whites at Princeton it often
seems as if, to them, I will always be Black first and a student second."2o
As a student at Harvard Law School, she protested that institution's paucity
of minority students and professors. 21 On the campaign trail, she noted her
awareness that some voters were concerned about Senator Obama's
II. G.D. Wekkin, Role Constraints and First Ladies, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 601-10 (2000);
Gil Troy, Mr. & Mrs. President? The Rise and Fall o/the Co-Presidency, 37 Soc. SCI. J.
591-600 (2000).
12. Richard Wolffe, Barack's Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2S, 2007, at 5.
13. Vennochi, supra note I, at 9D; Lisa Wangsness, Michelle Obama's Candor Cuts
2 Ways: Backers Delighted, but Her Critics Fume, B. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2008, at BI.
14. Wangsness, supra note 13, at BI (Mrs. Obama later clearly indicated that what
she meant was that she was "proud of this country, and I'm proud of the fact that people are
ready to roll up their sleeves and do something phenomenal.").
15. Liz Halloran, From the Soccer Field to the Stump, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp.,
Feb. II, 200S, at 14.
16. Gwen Ifill, Beside Barack,
Sept. 2007, at 5.
17. Wolffe, supra note 12, at 5.
IS. ld.
19. ld.
20. ld.
21. ld.
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electability due to his race. In response, she was more than willing to draw
parallels between Senator Obama's candidacy and Black freedom fighters of
the past. 22 She also was quite willing to indicate that such hesitance is "the
bitter legacy of racism and discrimination and oppression in this country."n
Mrs. Obama is an ardent supporter and fierce defender of her husband.
After one of his debates, she called his campaign team and bluntly made her
concerns clear. She indicated that Senator Clinton had packed the crowd with
her supporters, and that as a result, Senator Obama had been booed whenever
he criticized Senator Clinton. She told Senator Obama's aides that she did not
want that to happen again. One senior Obama aide who attended the meeting
described the incident as one of "a spouse saying, 'Do not do this to my
husband again. ",24
Despite her support for her husband, Mrs. Obama is no "traditional
Stepford booster, smiling vacantly at her husband and sticking to a script of
carefu11y vetted blandishments.,,25 She was, in her words, making sure Senator
Obama was "keeping it real.,,26 She did this by holding him accountable for
his responsibilities, even the most mundane, as a husband and father. For
instance, she insisted that Senator Obama return to Chicago despite being on
the campaign trail to attend his daughters' ballet recitals and parent-teacher
conferences. 27 Additionally, she has poked fun at her husband - commenting
on his snoring, morning breath, failure to put his socks in the hamper, and
leaving the butter out after breakfast. 28 When introduced at a speech in
Wisconsin, the woman who introduced Michelle accidentally said she was
"honored to introduce the next president!" Mrs. Obama stepped to the podium
with a big smile and told the crowd, "I like that promotion that 1 got. 1 don't
know if Barack knows yet. We can announce it on the news tonight. He's
going to be the First Lady.,,29 Her tactic, in her words, was to humanize her
husband for the public, so when he turns out not to be perfect, they will not be
disappointed. 30 Ultimately she scaled back such comments, realizing that
some supporters believed her comments were emasculating. 31
In addition to her outspokenness, Mrs. Obama's educational and
professional background is also notable. She grew up on the South Side of
Chicago to working-class parents. She excelled in school, skipping

22. See Allison Samuels, Daring to Touch the Third Rail: Barack Obama Avoids
Talking About the 'Race Issue. ' but His Wife Doesn't, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 39, 40.
23 Margaret Talev, Obama's Wife Reaches Out to Black Women, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Nov. 22, 2007, at 7A.
24. Wolffe, supra note 12, at 33.
25. Id.
26. [d.
27. [d.
28. Id.; Melinda Henneberger, The Obama Marriage, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2007, at 5.
29. Wolffe, supra note 12, at 29.
30. Henneberger, supra note 28.
31. Id.
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second grade and went on to earn her undergraduate degree from
Princeton and a law degree from Harvard. 32 After law school, she
practiced law at the Chicago offices of the law finn Sidley Austin and
most recently worked as a vice president of Community Relations for the
University of Chicago Hospitals. 33 By all accounts, Mrs. Obama is an
unconventional spouse to a presidential candidate and will likely be so as
First Lady.
Part II of this Article investigates the role that explicit attitudes about
race and gender play on voting decisions and the way they intersect in
employment decisions. Scholarship from the areas of political science
and law illustrate the challenges that Michelle Obama faced as a
candidate's spouse and soon-to-be First Lady. Part III investigates
implicit ("unconscious") race and gender biases and the role they play in
behavior, including voting and employment discrimination. Despite the
racial progress the United States has made, scholarship from the areas of
cognitive and social psychology as well as law illustrate the deep-seated
biases Mrs. Obama likely faced and will continue to face. Part IV
investigates the role of third-party employment discrimination, where
employees (typically White) are discriminated against because of the race
of their associates (typically Black). We extrapolate from jurisprudence
in this area to make some inferences about how attitudes about Michelle
Obama may have worked against her husband's candidacy for the
presidency of the United States. We conclude by exploring why negative
attitudes about Mrs. Obama may have dissipated over the course of
Senator Obama's presidential run and the role her presence in the White
House will have in de-biasing peopl e- at the implicit level - about
Black women.

II. RACE AND GENDER: INTERSECTIONALITY IN
EMPLOYMENT AND VOTING DISCRIMINATION
Race and gender are powerful variables that influence people's
decision making and behavior in a variety of contexts. Politics and
employment are among them. However, in addition to these variables in
isolation, their intersection has mUltiplicative predictive value.
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
If we assume Senator Clinton'S assessment that elections are like
"hiring decisions,,,34 then voter discrimination becomes an analog of
employment discrimination. In this context, Title VII of the Civil Rights

32. Karen Springen & Jonathan Darman, Ground Support, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29,
2007, at 40.
33. Id.
34. Acosta, supra note 3.

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

8

20:1

Act of 1964 is implicated by the roles of race and gender in the 2008
presidential election. Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate
because of - among other factors - race, color, and sex. 35 The landmark
cases that provide the litmus test for race and sex discrimination in the
workplace are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 36 and Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,37 respectively. Under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas, a complainant establishes a prima facie case for racial
discrimination when he shows that: (i) he is a racial minority; (ii) he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants with the complaintant's qualifications. 38 If the complainant
establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the
applicant. 39 The employer cannot, however, use the applicant's conduct as
pretext for discrimination nor may the employer engage in racial doublestandards. 40 The burden then shifts back to the applicant to demonstrate
that the reason proffered by the employer was pretextual
that is, was not
the true reason for the employment decision. Rather, the employer's true
motive for rejecting the candidate was discriminatory.41 This may be done
directly by demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more than likely
motivated the employer's decision or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 42
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court found clear signs that some of
the company's partners reacted negatively to a female employee's
personality because she was a woman. 43 Partners described her as
"macho," suggested that she "overcompensated for being a woman," and
advised her to take "a course at charm schooL"44 Another representative of
the company described the employee as someone who had "matured from a
tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner]
candidate.,,45 Most significant was the statement from one board member
as to what the employee needed to do in order to improve her chances to be
promoted to partner. He advised her to "walk more femininely, talk more

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2000).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
[d. at 802-03.
[d. at 804.
[d. at 804-805.
Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
[d.
[d.
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femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry.,,46 Social psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert witness,
testified "that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was
likely influenced by sex stereotyping.,,47 Her testimony focused on the
overtly sex-based comments of partners as well as on the gender-neutral
remarks made by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, but were
intensely critical of her. 48 According to Fiske, Hopkins' status as the only
woman in the pool of candidates, combined with the subjectivity of the
evaluations, made it likely that the sharply critical remarks resulted from
sex stereotyping. 49 The Court found that in previous years, other female
candidates for partnership were also evaluated in sex-based terms. 50 Those
who maintained their femininity were viewed favorably while "women's
Iib[b ]er" was used as a pejorative term for other female employees. 5 I
The Court held in Price Waterhouse that sex-stereotyped remarks in
the employment setting "do not inevitably prove that gender played a part
in a particular employment decision.,,52 The employee "must show that the
employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision."n "In
making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that
sex played a part."S4 The Court went on to hold that in a mixed-motive
case (where there is both a possible legitimate as well as a discriminatory
motive for the employment decision) the employer must show that its
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same
decision. 55
B. VOTING BEHAVIOR
Voting is not always based on rational choice; emotions also playa
significant role. 56 William Christ, for example, found that emotional
responses to candidates accurately predict voter preferences for more than
ninety percent of decided voters and eighty percent of undecided voters. 57
Most political advertisements are designed to either inspire voter
enthusiasm, by motivating their political engagement and loyalty, or induce
fear, by stimulating vigilance against the risks some candidates supposedly

46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
/d.
/d.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 236.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.

/d. at 251.
/d.
/d.
Id. at 252.
56. See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING
THE FATE OF THE NATION xiii-xv (2007).
57. William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to
Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 250 (1985).

52.
53.
54.
55.
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pose. 58 Other research shows that political advertisements that provoke
anxiety stimulate attention toward the campaign and discourage reliance on
habitual cues for voting; in other words, advertisements of this type can
induce crossover voting. S9 Likeability also affects voting. One study has
shown that disengaged voters who watched entertainment-oriented talk
show interviews of Al Gore and George W. Bush were more likely to vote
against their party loyalties when they found the crossover candidate
likeable. 60 As with most decisions, both passion and reason influence
voting, so it is no surprise that emotionally evocative concepts like race and
gender impact voting.
1. Race and Voting
Race has long held currency among Americans in their
determinations of whom to elect to public office. Because Black and
White voters typically prefer candidates of their own race in elections
where one candidate is Black and the other is White, Black candidates
rarely succeed outside of political jurisdictions in which Blacks are a
majority of the voters. 61
Experimental research supports the idea that Black candidates face
significant hurdles in gaining support from White voters. In one study,
Nayda Terkildsen found that given two fictitious candidates described
identically on dimensions other than race, White voters are more likely
to vote for the White candidate over either a dark-skinned or lightskinned Black candidate. 62 Furthermore, racially prejudiced White
58. Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and
Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005).
59. George E. Marcus & Michael B. Mackuen, Anxiety. Enthusiasm. and the Vote:
The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential
Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 672, 677-78 (1993).
60. Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk
Show Circuit, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 213,223-30 (2005).
61. See LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 247 (1999); HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 178-81 (2000). At
the state level, only one of the fifty "elected" state governors is Black (Deval Patrick of
Massachusetts); Senator Obama is the only Black member of the U.S. Senate. Up to year
the 2000, only four Blacks had ever served in the U.S. Senate, and only two since
Reconstruction. Id. The House of Representatives is more representative, with nearly ten
percent of its members being Black, but this success is attributable to racial gerrymandering
of House Districts. In areas dominated by Whites, Black electoral success is rare. This
relationship between racial make-up of districts and electability of Blacks has been weJldemonstrated. See David A. Bositis, The Future ofMajority-Minority Districts and AfricanAmerican and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY
REPRESENTATION: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 942 (David A.
Bostis ed., 1998); Lisa Handley et aI., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to
Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the
Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s 13-38
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998).
62. Nayda Terkildsen, When White Voters Evaluate African-American Candidates:
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voters expressed more negative attitudes about Black candidates than
less prejudiced White voters. 63
Experimental research by Donald Kinder and David Sears
demonstrates the mechanism through which race can influence voting. 64
Kinder and Sears tested competing theories of White prejudice against
Blacks - realistic group conflict theory (emphasizing tangible threats that
Blacks might pose to Whites' private lives) and symbolic racism
(emphasizing moralistic resentment of Blacks) - as predictors of Whites'
voting behavior. Specifically, they tested these theories in light of the 1969
and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral campaigns in which Thomas Bradley
(Black/liberal) and Samuel Yorty (White/conservative) were the
candidates. 65 They found that more prejudiced individuals supported Yorty
and that symbolic racism better predicts White voting behavior than group
conflict theory. 66
The success of Black candidates is related to several factors. First,
Whites are less likely to engage in racial cross-over voting (in mayoral, city
council, or congressional elections) when the incumbent is White. 67 They
are also less likely to vote for Black candidates who run for higher level
(i.e., top (city)) positions. 68 Furthermore, Whites are less likely to engage
in cross-over voting in general elections or run-off elections. 69 They are
also less likely to engage in cross-over voting when the local press does not
endorse the Black candidate. 70
Second, few Blacks vis-a-vis Whites at the community level have a
negative impact on Whites' cross-over voting. 7l Presumably, as close
inter-racial interactions increase, "the probability that [Whites] will adopt
political attitudes and behaviors similar to those [Blacks] with whom they
interact increases."n Conversely, at the macro-level (e.g., statewide), with

The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1032, 1040 (1993).
63. Terkildsen, supra note 62, at 1043.
64. Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism
Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981).
65. Id.at417.
66. Id. at 421-26.
67. Charles S. Bullock, III, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black
Officials, 46 J. POL. 238, 247 (1984).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Endorsements of the Black candidate by local white-controlled newspapers
in biracial elections provide White voters with "important voting cues as to the candidates'
qualifications and political acceptability .... " Joel Lieske, The Political Dynamics of Urban
Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 154 (1989).
71. Thomas M. Carsey, The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior:
The 1989 New York City Mayoral Election, 57 J. POL. 221, 225-27 (1995); Lisa C.
DeLorenzo et aI., The Impact of Cross-Racial Voting on St. Louis Primary Election Results,
33 URB. AFF. REv. 120, 125-30 (1997).
72. Carsey, supra note 71, at 223.
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more Blacks vis-a-vis Whites, the perception of racial threat provokes
negative reactions to Black candidates among Whites. 73 Among the factors
that seem to enhance such sentiments are the size of the Black population, 74
the history of race relations in the community, and the salience of racial
issues in the campaign. 75
2. Gender and Voting
Blatant and widespread discrimination among the electorate against
female candidates has diminished considerably in recent years. 76
Moreover, compared to race, gender has been a less divisive issue. 77 Some
studies have found that voters harbor little bias against women; 78 and in
some instances, women candidates may have an advantage over their male
counterparts. 79 Once on the ballot, women are as successful as men at
being elected into office. 80
This is not to say that there are no gender divisions among the
electorate. Since Ronald Reagan's first presidential term, a partisan gender
gap has existed in national elections; women voters disproportionately
favor Democratic candidates, and men generally lean toward
Republicans. 81 Furthermore, women voters frequently favor Democratic
Party policies. 82 However, this has not led candidates to engage in a
gender analogue to race-baiting. 83 The reason for this may be that most
successful women politicians are themselves people whose profiles are
counter-stereotypical. As such, they do not seem as vulnerable to subtle
efforts to invoke stereotypes. And there is no contemporary history of an
analogous "Bradley Effect" in elections involving women. 84 The Bradley

73. Carsey, supra note 71, at 222.
74. V.O. KEy, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
Vintage Books 1949) (indicating that Whites fear maintenance of control over Blacks where
Blacks are a large part of the population).
75. THOMAS F. PETIIGREW, Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND
MINORITIES 15 (Herrington J. Bryce ed., 1976); RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF
PROGRESS 15 (\974).
76. See, e.g., Carol Chaney & Barbara Sinclair, Women and the 1992 House
Elections, in THE YEAR OF THE WOMAN 123, 123-39 (Elizabeth Adell Cook et al. eds.,
1994).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate
Evaluation: Good News and Bad News Jor Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF POLITICS 30 (Victor C. Ottati et aI., eds., 2002).
81. Id.
82. See Mark Schlesinger & Caroline Heldman, Gender Gap or Gender Gaps?: New
Perspectives on SupportJor Government Action Policies, 63 J. POL. 59, 73-83 (2001).
83. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2.
84. See id. The Bradley Effect, named for former Mayor Tom Bradley of Los
Angeles, is the tendency for polls to overestimate White support for a Black political
candidate. Kent Jenkins, Jr. & R.B. Melton, Wilder Revels in His Triumph: Slim Margin
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Effect, which has come to define Black politician electoral losses when
wins are expected but wins by smaller margins than expected occur, is
attributed to White voters lying to pollsters about who they are likely to
vote for in elections where one candidate is Black and the other is White. 85
Yet, scholars find that gender stereotyping linked to traditional sexroles still pervades electoral politics. 86 Experimental research by Leonie
Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, for example, finds that women candidates
who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a great
disadvantage. 87 Similarly, voters who prioritize issues such as terrorism,
homeland security, and United States involvement in Iraq are more likely
to believe that a man would better handle these issues as President. 88
Furthermore, party leaders (who are as much aware of the stereotypes as
researchers) focus primarily on finding winning candidates. 89 Party leaders
believe there is a greater tendency toward increased uncertainty over a
woman's electability than a man's. 90
C.

RACE AND GENDER IN THE 2008 CAMPAIGN

Gregory Parks and Jeffrey Rachlinski address the various ways in
which race and gender have expressly manifested themselves in the 2008
election. 91 Their research provides a great deal of context and nuance to
this issue and connects these forms of bias in the campaign with Title VII
case law. 92 Exit polls, however, provide the clearest and most concise
indication of race and gender bias. 93
As illustrated by the accompanying tables, blatant and express racial
attitudes played a significant role in the 2008 presidential primary race. 94
Table I demonstrates that in twenty-eight out of thirty-seven
Puzzles Analysts, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at AI.
85. See Patrick Reddy, Does McCall Have a Chance?: Yes, He Does, but AfricanAmerican Candidates for Top State Offices Face an Uphill Climb, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 20,
2002, at HI; Jenkins & Melton, supra note 84.
86. Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attributions of
Leadership Traits, 46 POLl. REs. Q. 527 (1993); KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN:
How THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 8, 9, 59-67 (2004); RICHARD LOGAN
Fox, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 173-75 (1997); David Niven, Party
Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57, 75 (1998); Kira
Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002).
87. Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen, The Consequences of Gender Stereotypesfor
Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office, 46 POL. REs. Q. 503, 518
(1993).
88. Erika Falk & Kate Kenski, Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for
Women in Times of War and Terrorism, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. I, 12 (2006).
89. KIRA SANBONMATSU, WHERE WOMEN RUN: GENDER & PARTY IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 3, 22, 26-30,37-86,97-115,118-19 (2006).
90. Id. at 28-29.
91. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2.
92. !d.
93. See app., tbl.l-2.
94. See app., tb1.2.
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primaries/caucuses for which we have exit poll data, Whites voted for Senator
Clinton in higher numbers than for Senator Obama. 95 Asian and Latino
Americans also voted for Senator Clinton in higher numbers in eight out of
eleven of those primaries/caucuses. 96 Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2,
where voters indicated that race influenced their voting decisions, a higher
percentage of individuals voted for Senator Clinton in sixteen states compared
to twelve states for Senator Obarna. 97 When we subtract from Senators
Clinton's and Senator Obama's columns those states that they would likely
have won due to their roots there
Arkansas and New York for Clinton and
Illinois for Obama - Senator Clinton still benefits. 98 This was most
pronounced in West Virginia and Kentucky.99 Such preference of a White
candidate over a Black candidate simply because of race implicates Title VII.
As illustrated in Table I, in twenty-six out of thirty-seven
primaries/caucuses for which we have exit poll data, men voted for Senator
Obama in higher numbers than Senator Clinton. IOO As illustrated in Table 2,
however, in states where voters indicated that gender was a deciding factor in
their decision to cast their votes, only six out of twenty-nine went to Senator
Obarna. 101 Among these states, one was Illinois, while the other five were
states with sizeable Black populations. 102 These results suggest that though
gender was a factor in the 2008 presidential primary campaign, it was not as
large a factor as race. Openly acknowledged male support for Senator Obama,
at least, seems to be complicated by home-state advantage and votes arising
from racial solidarity. 103
These fmdings are in a sense unremarkable. There is a lingering question
that emanates from the 2008 Presidential Primary campaign: Are Americans
more racist or more sexist?l04 Despite Gloria Steinem's assertion that "gender
is probably the most restricting force in American life," at least in this section,
the data suggest that race was more of a driving force. lOS Such findings
amplifY those of Jeffrey Timberlake and Sarah Estes, who demonstrate that
where race and gender are analyzed together - in particular with regard to
stereotyping - race provides greater predictive power. 106

95. App., tbLI.
96. Jd.

97. App., tbl.2.

98.ld.
99. !d.
100. App., tbLL
101. App., tbl.2.
102. Id.
103. Cf Kevin J. Flannelly, Voting for Female Candidates: Effects of Voters' Age,
Ethnicity, and Gender, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 398 (2002).
104. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Is America Too Racistfor Barack? Too Sexist for
Hillary? WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2006, at B I.
105. Gloria Steinem, Op-Ed, Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2008, at 23A ("I'm not advocating a competition for who has it the toughest.").
106. Jeffrey M. Timberlake & Sarah Beth Estes, Do Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes
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INTERSECTIONALITY AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Race and sex are two classifications on which a prima facie case of
employment discrimination may be based. 107 Although color is yet another
classification for a prima facie showing of employment discrimination, 108
colorism claims (discrimination based upon gradations in skin color) are
one example of the more complex race discrimination claims courts face. 109
Racism (including colorism) and sexism are interconnected systems of
discrimination and oppression. t 10 The juncture at which they intersect
provides a fruitful and unique area of discrimination study. 1t I
A number of employment discrimination cases have wrangled with the
intersection of race and gender, particularly regarding Black women. Some
circuits fail to demonstrate an appreciation of this race-gender interaction.
For example, in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., five
Black women sued their former employer charging, among other things,
that the company's seniority system and "last hired-first fired" layoff
policy was discriminatory. I 12 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of
exclusively Black women who were the victims of GM's alleged
discrimination. 1I3 The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not
allowed to create a "super-remedy" by combining both race and sex
discrimination. 114 In Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., Payne, a Black
woman, and several other plaintiffs sued their employer for discrimination
based on differential referrals of men and women to certain positions and
the absence of Black employees above a certain level. 115 The Fifth Circuit
Depend on the Sex of Target Group Members? EVidencefrom a Survey-Based Experiment,
48 Soc. Q. 399, 419-20 (2007).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The statutory language expressly provides
"[It]shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
108. /d.
109. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1705, 1724 (2000); see generally Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and
White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than
Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 131
(1997); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Low of Skin Color, 49 DUKE LJ. 1487 (2000).
110. See Caldwell, supra note 4, at 371-72 (stating, "[r]acism and sexism are
mutually-reinforcing components of a system of dominance rooted in patriarchy.").
Ill. Id. at 372 ("No significant and lasting progress in combating [racism or sexism]
can be made until ... the perspectives gained from considering their interaction are reflected
in legal theory and public policy.").
112. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 482 (8th Cir.
1977).
113. Id.
114. DeGraffenreid, 558 F.2d at 483. The lower court similarly held that Title VII
did not create a new sub-category of "Black women" with standing independent of Black
men. See DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Ass. Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
115. Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 1982).
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held that the interests of the Black women plaintiffs conflicted with
those of Black men, since the plaintiffs attempted to prove that men
were promoted at women's expense despite the court's finding of racial
discrimination. 116 In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., Moore, a Black
woman, filed suit on behalf of a class of Black women employees
alleging discrimination in the selection of employees for various labor
grades and positions. 117 The Ninth Circuit upheld a district court
decision refusing to allow Moore to represent either White women
employees or Black male employees. 118 The Court of Appeals agreed
with the lower court that Moore was an inadequate representative of
white women employees, not because she did not claim sex
discrimination, but rather because she was also Black. 119 Similarly,
Moore was not allowed to represent Black male employees, not because
she did not allege race discrimination but because she was also a
woman. 120
Other circuits, however, have acknowledged the realities of
intersectionality. In Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance,
Inc., Jenkins, a Black woman, sued her employer on her own behalf and
on behalf of a class. 121 The suit alleged denial of promotion, better
assignments, and ultimately termination for "race, sex, and black styles
of hair and dress.,,122 After relying on Vuyanich v. Republic National
Bank,123 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was eligible to
represent a class of Blacks and women. 124
In Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., Jefferies, a
Black woman, sued her employer on the grounds that during the nearly
four years she was employed, she failed to receive any promotions. 125
When she applied for a field representative position during her fourth
year with the company, a Black man was promoted over her.126 In
looking to the specific language of Title VII,127 the Fifth Circuit
116. Payne, 673 F.2d at 810-12.
117. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 480.
119. /d.
120. /d.
121. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1976).
122. /d.
123. Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 409 F, Supp 1083, 1089 (N,D, Tex. 1976)
(holding that the plaintiff could sue on race and gender inasmuch as her superior told her
that she (a Black woman) "probably did not need a job anyway, because her husband was a
Caucasian," since that statement discriminated against both Blacks and women, as it could
not be made to either a white person or a male),
124. Jenkins, 538 F,2d at 169.
125, Jeffiies v. Harris County Cmty, Action Ass'n, 615 F,2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1980).
126. Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1029,
127. 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Title VII provides a remedy against employment discrimination based upon an employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." (emphasis added by authors).
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construed "or" to imply congressional "intent to prohibit employment
discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics." 128
E.

THE RACE/GENDER NEXUS AND MICHELLE OBAMA

Political science and legal scholarship illustrates two important
challenges for Michelle Obama. With regard to gender, a significant
challenge for Mrs. Obama is to not wield too much power or influence.
As much progress as women have made in electoral politics, the role of
First Lady has evolved more slowly.129 Historically, First Ladies have
served conventional roles. Not only did they serve as the official hosts
to the White House,130 they also reached out to women during their
husbands' campaigns. 131 In addition, they served as a liaison between
the White House and women's organizations 132 and promoted the
administration's women-oriented programs and policies. 133 However,
First Ladies are now faced with the paradox of traditional, aristocratic
demands that they act like "ladies" and more modern demands that they
be models of social concern and actively involved in the political
agenda. 134 Failure to conform to these constrained gender roles incites
critical media reaction. 135 In other words, the more politically active the
First Lady, the more negative press coverage she receives.136 Being
outspoken and recognized for her critical role in her husband's
campaign, voter attitudes towards Michelle Obama were likely
influenced by gender.
With regard to race, Mrs. Obama may be perceived as "too Black."
To some degree, this idea may be taken literally. People have long held
more negative attitudes towards darker-skinned Blacks vis-a.-vis those
who are fairer-skinned. 137 For instance, light-skinned Blacks are
perceived as more attractive than dark-skinned Blacks, which is
particularly true in the case of Black women. 138 As such, Black
128. Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032..
129. Erica Scharrer & Kim Bissell, Overcoming Traditional Boundaries: The Role of
Political Activity in Media Coverage ofFirst Ladies, 21 WOMEN & POL. 55, 56 (2000).
130. See generally Edith P. Mayo, Party Politics: The Political Impact of the First
Ladies' Social Role, 37 Soc. SCI. J. 577 (2000).
131. See Jill Abraham Hummer, First Ladies and American Women: Representation
and the Modem Presidency (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with Hastings Women's Law Journal).
132. See id. at 137-218.
133. See id. at 219-63.
134. See Wekkin, supra note 11, at 601-08.
135. Betty Houchin Winfield, "Madame President"; Understanding a New Kind of
First Lady, 8 MEOlA STUD. 1. 59,61 (1994).
136. Scharrer & Bissell, supra note 129, at 69-74.
137. See generally Banks, supra note 109, at 1714-24; see also Jones, supra note
109.
138. Mark E. Hill, Skin Color and the Perception of Attractiveness Among African
Americans: Does Gender Make a Difference?, 65 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 77, 83-86 (2002).
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women's closer approximation to Whiteness is deemed to be a
particularly feminine characteristic among Blacks 139 and may be so
among Whites as well. Similarly, intersectionality affects Whites'
perception process, which leads to gender categorization errors for
Black women. 140 Consequently, "Blackness" and "maleness" are highly
associated for Black men and women. 141 Furthermore, women are
deemed as unattractive commensurate with their perceived masculinity,
leading Whites to rate Black women as less attractive than other
More fitting, however, is a less literal and more
women. 142
philosophical assessment of Michelle Obama' s blackness. Blacks who
downplay their race and attempt to assimilate with the larger White
society are deemed to be less threatening by Whites than those who
assimilate less. 143 Furthermore, Blacks who assimilate more are, in
turn, viewed as "good Blacks" by Whites. l44 Preference for a White
over Black is neither a dichotomous issue nor a simple matter of skin
color. Perceptions about a Black person's racial ideology, on a
continuum, may also provoke discrimination. In the employment
context, for example, Gordon v. JKP Enterprises, Inc. held that a Black
plaintiff was discriminated against by her employer for being "too
ethnic" or "pro-Black." 145 Thus, because she has been more pointed
about racial issues (or at least more so than Senator Obama) voters'
negative attitudes about Mrs. Obama may be largely influenced by race.
Much research on discrimination has focused separately on the
effects of race or gender, ignoring the reality that Black women must
deal with the joint effects of dual minority statuses, originally termed
"double jeopardy." 146
Interactive models utilize the concept of
"multiple jeopardy," further accounting for Black women's unique
social location at the intersection of many different status hierarchies
(including race, gender, and class), which produces experiences distinct
from those of White women. 147 Such models highlight the challenges

139. Hill, supra note 138, at 80.
140. See generally Phillip Atiba Goff et aI., "Ain't I a Woman?": Towards an
Intersectional Approach to Person Perception and Group-based Harms, 59 SEX ROLES 392
(2008).
141. !d. at 397-401.

142.ld.
143. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REv.
1141, 1164 (2007).
144. Id.; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 V.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1895,1899 (2007).
145. Gordon v. JKP Enter. Inc., No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at *1, *10 (5th Cir.
April 9, 2002).
146. FRANCIS BEALE, Double Jeopardy: To be Black and Female, in THE BLACK
WOMAN: AN ANTHOLOGY 111-114 (Toni Cade, ed., 1970).
147. Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context ofa
Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42-72 (1988).
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faced by Michelle Obama. Specifically, the intersection of Michelle
Obama's racial and gender identity and politics - discussing issues of
race, critiquing her husband openly and honestly, and discussing workfamily balance for women - could ultimately leave voters fearing that
she is an "angry Black woman" 148 or wondering and critiqu~ng, "Why is
she so womanish?" 149

III. IMPLICIT BIAS AND VOTERIEMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Undeniably, Americans have made tremendous progress with regards
to attitudes about race and gender in the past several decades. This
progress, however, has occurred primarily at a surface level within society.
Research on implicit attitudes, which are judgments that are automatically
activated without a person's awareness or intention, ISO suggests that
negative, stereotypical attitudes about Blacks and women are still
pervasive. These attitudes are evidenced in both voting and employment
decisions.
A.

IMPLICIT ATTITUDES

People's reports of their cognitive processes are often not consistent
with their judgments. 151 Many influences on judgment seem to operate
outside of people's awareness. 152 Combining this observation with
contemporary research on thought processing, psychologists now argue that
people rely on parallel cognitive systems of judgment: one is rapid,
intuitive, and unconscious; the other is slow, deductive, and deliberative. 153
The intuitive system often dictates choice, with the deductive system
lagging behind, struggling to produce reasons for a choice that comports

148. See Erica Chito Childs, Looking Behind the Stereotypes of the "'Angry Black
Woman ": An Exploration of Black Women's Responses to Interracial Relationships, 19
GENDER & SOC'y 544 (2005); see also Verdict: Beat the Press, Fox News Host Discusses
"'Angry Black Women" (MSNBC television broadcast June 16, 2008), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2008/06/17/fox-news-host-discusses-a_n_107526.html.
149. See Katrice Annette Albert, Why Is She So Womanish?: The Relationship
Between Racial Identity Attitudes and Womanist Identity Attitudes in African American
College Women (August 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University) (on file
with Hastings Women's Law Journal). The term "womanist" is a synonym for black
feminist or feminist of color. See ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS:
WOMANISTPROSE xi-xii (1983).
150. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes. 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4-5 (1995).
151. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal
Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 118,
121-23,125,127 (1978).

152. See id.
153. See Chris Guthrie et aI., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REv. 1,6-9 (2007) (reviewing this literature).
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with the accessible parts of memory. 154 Thus, an intuitive, gut reaction
against a candidate can dictate choice. The rational account follows later
and might not provide a fully accurate account of the decision.
Research on implicit bias indicates that race and gender biases can
influence unconscious, emotional processes, wholly apart from the
conscious, rational ones. 155
Psychologists term these unconscious,
emotional influences "implicit biases"- attitudes or thoughts that people
hold but might not explicitly endorse. 156 These attitudes might conflict
with expressly held values or beliefs. Many people who embrace the
egalitarian norm that skin color should not affect their judgment of a job or
political candidate also unwittingly harbor negative associations about
minorities. 157 People might not even be aware that they hold these
attitudes. 158 Even so, these implicit cognitions influence how people
evaluate others. 159 The implicit cognitive processes might heavily
influence the final choice of a voter who does not otherwise clearly
embrace one candidate over another. 160
Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to measure
implicit cognitions. These methods have proven to be particularly useful
for studying bias against Blacks or stereotypes about women. This is so for
two key reasons. First, when explicit measures are used, individuals may
not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because of social desirability
biases, thus not elucidating the actual magnitude of the relationship that
would exist between attitudes and, for example, political outcomes. 161 The
second comparative advantage is that individuals may not even be aware of
their true preferences or attitudes and thus cannot report them if asked. 162
The Implicit Association Test ("IAT") has rapidly become the most

154. See Guthrie et al., supra note 153.
ISS. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv 945, 951 (2006).
156. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150 at 4-5; see also Brian A. Noesk et aI., The
Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES
265-267 (John A. Bargh cd., 2007).
157. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Age 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 53, 55-56 (2006); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 155, at 951.
158. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150, at 4-5 (1995).
159. See Anthony G. Greenwald et aI., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: 1II. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 4 (October 12, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.); Kristin A.
Lane et aI., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. Soc. SCI. 427, 435-37 (2007)
(reviewing evidence that the implicit social cognition predicts behavior).
160. See infra notes 165 to 227 and accompanying text.
161. Cindy D. Kam, Implicit Attitudes. Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming
Predicts Candidate Preference, 29 POL. BEHAV. 343, 345 (2007).
162. Kam, supra note 161, at 345.
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widely used measure of implicit bias. 163 The IA T is a procedure that seeks
to assess latent attitudes by measuring their underlying automatic
evaluation. l64 Using cognitive priming procedures, it measures the relative
strength of associations between pairs of concepts to determine automatic
affect or attitude. In the initial IA T task, participants are required to
separate different images into categories (e.g., race, gender, weight, etc.).
Next, participants are required to sort different attributes as pleasant or
unpleasant in meaning. In the next steps, the images and attributes are
superimposed, pairing images with closely associated and not-so-closely
associated attributes. The more closely associated two concepts are, the
easier it is to respond to them as a pair. Thus, the IAT measures relative
strength of associations between targets and certain attributes based on the
difficulty (Le., response time) of the sorting process.
1. Race

Research on the IAT, which pairs White and Black faces with positive
and negative words, shows that roughly seventy percent of Whites harbor
anti-BlackJpro-White biases. 165 Web-based IAT samples with thousands of
participants reveal strong biases with several characteristics: People
associate light skin with good and dark skin with bad; 166 White faces with
harmless objects and Black faces with weapons. 167 The proper
interpretation of these results has been a matter of some debate,168 but most
scholars conclude that the IAT can measure implicit biases. 169
A study by Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues shows just how
broad-based implicit biases can be. In this study, participants found it
easier to associate their in-group (i.e., American names) with pleasant
words and the out-group (i.e., Surinamese names) with unpleasant words
than they found it to make reverse pairings, even though participants lacked
experience with Suriname. 170 Even with equally unfamiliar exemplars for
both in-group and out-group, they nevertheless displayed a pro-in-group

163. See Lane et aL, supra note 159, at 430 (noting that techniques that assess
response times are the most widely used methods for ascertaining implicit attitudes).
164. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150, at 4-5.
165. Brian A. Nosek, et aL, Pervasiveness and Correlates oj Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REv. Soc. PSYCHOL. 36, 45 (2007).
166. Kristin A. Lane, et aI., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV:
What We Know So Far About the Method, in IMPLICT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 62-67 (Bernd
Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
167. B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role ojAutomatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 183-86, 188
(2001).
168. See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. TeUock, Attributions oj Implicit Prejudice, or
"Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the IAT?," 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 260-61 (2004).
169. Lane et aI., supra note 166, at 72, 91.
170. Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et aI., Implicit Associations as the Seeds oj Intergroup
Bias: How Easily Do They Take Root?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 789, 792 (2001).
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IAT bias. Thus, even with only minimal experiential or historical input,
peoples' minds are prepared to display bias effortlessly. 171
A study by Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji found that individuals
make no distinction between Blacks and Whites on explicit measures of
"Americanness.,,172 On implicit measures, however, participants more
easily paired American symbols with White faces than with Black faces. 173
In a second study, Devos and Banaji used photos of eight Black and eight
White United States track and field athletes who participated in the 2000
Olympics, 174 The assumption was that Blacks who represented their
country in the Olympics should appear more American than those who did
not. 175 On the measure of familiarity, participants reported being more
familiar with Black athletes than with White athletes. '76 Taking the two
explicit self-report measures together, participants were both more familiar
with Black than White athletes and reported a stronger association between
Black athletes and American than White athletes and American. 177 On the
IAT, however, the reverse was found, with White athletes being more
strongly associated with the category "American" than Black athletes. 178
White and Asian Americans associated Whites with the concept
"American" to a greater extent than Blacks. 179 Furthermore, in a study by
Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, they found that when Whites and Asians
were primed with the American flag (shown subliminal images), their
attitudes toward Blacks become even more negative,I80
A study by Phillip Goff and colleagues investigated the relationship
between implicit racial attitudes and dehumanization of Blacks. In their
first study, individuals were subliminally shown images of Black faces,
White faces, or neutral images. 181 Then they were shown fuzzy images of

171. See Ashburn-Nardo, supra note 170, at 794-95. See also Nilanjana Dasgupta et
aI., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316,321-23 (2000) (fmding that positive attributes were more
strongly associated with White than Black Americans even when: (a) pictures of equally
unfamiliar Black and White individuals were used as stimuli; and (b) differences in stimulus
familiarity were statistically controlled).
172. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White, 88 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 447, 452-53 (2005).
173. Id.
174. /d.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 455.
179. Id. at 459.
180. Melissa J. Ferguson et aI., The American Flag Increases Prejudice Toward
African-Americans, 4-28 (unpublished rnanuscript)( on file with authors).
181. Phillip Atiba Goff et aI., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge. Historical
Dehumanization. and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL.
292, 294 (2008).

Winter 2009]

MICHELLE OBAMA

23

animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became clearer. 182
Individuals were instructed to indicate the point at which they could
identify the image. 183 Goff and colleagues found that both Whites and nonWhites more quickly associated Blacks, as compared to Whites, with
apes. 184 In a second study, individuals were first subliminally shown
images of ape line drawings or jumbled line drawings. 185 Second, they
were given a facial interference task designed to gauge how distracted
participants would become when presented with faces prior to a test
measuring their attentional bias to Black and White faces. 186 Their results
indicated that priming individuals with images of apes demonstrated more
attentional bias towards Black faces. 18 ? Moreover, Goff and colleagues
found that implicit anti-Black biases predicted this ape-Black
association. 188
These biases generally begin at an early age. Baron and Banaji
assessed White American six-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults using a
child-oriented version of the lAT. Remarkably, even the youngest group
showed implicit pro-White/anti-Black bias, with self-reported attitudes
revealing bias in the same direction. 189 The ten-year-olds and adults
showed the same magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial
attitudes became substantially less biased in older children and vanished
entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable attitudes toward
Whites and Blacks. 190 It seems that people learn bias early but only later
learn to cover the bias by publicly embracing more egalitarian nonns.
The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit
attitudes towards race and measures of implicit bias. 191 Although explicit
and implicit measures of bias are related, even people who openly embrace
egalitarian nonns often harbor very negative associations concerning
Blacks. 192 Even participants who are told that the TAT measures
undesirable racist attitudes and who explicitly self-report egalitarian
attitudes find it difficult to control their biased responses. 193 These
findings suggest that the explicit and implicit studies measure somewhat

182. Goffet aI., supra note 181, at 295.
183. Id.
184. ld. at 296.
185. !d. at 297.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 298-99.
188. Id. at 30 l.
189. Baron & Banaji, supra note 157, at 55.
190. Id. at 56.
191. See Lane et aI., supra note 166.
192. See generally Baron & Banaji, supra note 156 (indicating that whereas
seemingly egalitarian views about race emerge over time, implicit racial attitudes stay the
same).
193. Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test, 66
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 83, 92 (2003).
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different cognitive systems. The explicit measures show that most adults
have learned the importance of egalitarian norms - or at least the
importance of embracing such norms publicly.
2. Gender
The research on implicit bias also indicates that most people hold
implicit biases about gender. People misattribute high status more readily
to unknown men than to unknown women. 194 They associate "male" with
"hierarchical" and "female" with "egalitarian" 195 and evaluate male
authority figures more favorably than their female counterparts. 196 Priming
people to think about dependence or aggression influences their judgments
of men and women. They judge women, but not men, as more dependent
while thinking about dependence and judge men, but not women, as more
aggressive while thinking about aggression. 197 Men also automatically
associate maleness with power. 198
Not surprisingly, these attitudes towards men and women translate
directly into evaluations of potential careers. Web-based IAT studies
reveal that people more closely associate men with science and women
with humanities. 199 People more easily associate "engineer" with men and
"elementary school teacher" with women than the opposite pairing. 2OO In
one study, participants primed with words associated with historically male
roles (like "doctor") tended to categorize a subsequent gender-neutral
pronoun as being male, while participants primed with words associated
with historically female roles (like "nurse") tended to categorize a
subsequent gender-neutral pronoun as being female. 201 Like studies of
racial bias, even participants who explicitly reject gender-based stereotypes
concerning careers carry these implicit biases. 202 Web-based IA T studies

194. See generally Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, implicit Gender
Stereotyping in Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86, 189,
190-91,192-93 (\995).
195. Marianne Schmid Mast, Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An
implicit Gender Stereotype, 63 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 107, 109-10 (2004).
196. Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, implicit and Explicit Attitudes
Toward Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1315, 1319-24 (2000).
197. Mahzarin R. Banaji et aL, implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 272,275-76 (1993).
198. Laurie A. Rudman et aI., Implicit Self-concept and Evaluative implicit Gender
Stereotypes: Self and ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1164, 1167-68 (2001).
199. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, REs. & PRACTICE 101, 105, 107-08
(2002).
200. Michael J. White & Gwendolen B. White, implicit and Explicit Occupational
Gender Stereotypes, 55 SEX ROLES 259, 263-64 (2006).
201. Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 136, 136-139 (1996).
202. ld. at 138-39.
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also reveal that both men and women tend to link "male" with "career" and
"female" with "family."z03 Among men, this connection is consistent with
their explicit statements about gender stereotypes, although women
explicitly reject such connections as inconsistent with their beliefs. Z04
Like implicit race biases, many of the associations involving gender
cast men in a more favorable light. However, the relationship involving
gender is somewhat more complicated. Women reveal a strong automatic
preference for female words (e.g., "her" or "she") over male words (e.g.,
"him" or "he"), whereas men harbor no preference. 2os Moreover, women's
automatic in-group bias is much stronger than men's in-group bias,
although this tendency is most pronounced among women who have
positive self-esteem. 206 Rudman and Greenwald captured the essence of
this phenomenon with two phrases characterizing women and men,
respectively: "If I am good and I am female, females are good," and "Even
if I am good and I am male, men are not necessarily good.,,207 Rudman and
Greenwald also discovered, in two other studies, that individuals harbor a
pro-female bias to the extent that they favor their mothers over their
fathers 208 and associate maleness with violence, all at the implicit level. 209
B. IMPLICIT BIAS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES/BEHAVIOR

Research has shown that implicit attitudes influence prejudice and
intergroup discrimination in a variety of contexts, ZIO including voting
processes. Social scientists who have failed to find racial polarization in
voters' candidate preferences have readily acknowledged "covert
racism"ZII or voter "misreporting,,21Z as explanations for why they failed to
detect results in their studies. Research on implicit bias and political
attitudes and behavior, however, seems to provide a better link between

203. Nosek et aI., supra note 199, at 105, 108-09.
204. /d. at 109.
205. Eugene V. Aidman & Steve M. Carroll, Implicit Individual Differences:
Relationships Between Implicit Self-Esteem, Gender Identity, and Gender Attitudes, 17 EUR.
J. PERSONALITY 19,27-28 (2003).
206. Laurie A. Rudman & Stephenie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic
In-Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More Than Men Like Men?, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 497-98 (2004).
207. Id. at 498.
208. /d. at 500-01.
209. Id. at 502-03.
210. John F., Dovidio et aI., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled
Processes, 33 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 510-40 (2001); Allen R. McConnell &

Jill M. Leibold., Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior,
and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 435, 435-42
(2001).
211. Jack Citrin et aI., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race
Matter?, 54 PuB. OPINION Q. 74, 92 (1990).
212. Benjamin Highton, White Voters and African American Candidates for
Congress, 26 POL. BEHAV. 1, 11-12 (2004).
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people's racial attitudes and their voting behavior. For example, people
who endorse right-of-center political views also tend to associate Black
with bad and White with good on the IAT.213 Similarly, political
conservatism is associated with White in-group favoritism on both implicit
and explicit measures. 214
Implicit attitudes affect how people vote. 215 In one study, Karn
examined the impact of an implicit measure of attitudes towards an ethnic
group on citizens' willingness to support a minority candidate. 216 She either
identified the candidates' party affiliations or omitted that information. 217
Karn found that for the implicit measure, Democrats who held the most
favorable views towards Hispanics were nearly four times as likely to prefer
the Hispanic candidate compared with their counterparts who held the least
positive implicit views towards Hispanics. 218 Implicit measures of attitudes
towards Hispanics were much less relevant when party cues were available,
however. 219 Even participants who expressed highly negative implicit
attitudes towards Hispanics nevertheless voted for Hispanic candidates
identified as being from the political party that they favor. 22o This suggests
that Democrats can overcome their implicit biases in an effort to vote for a
Democrat regardless of race. This theory, however, may only extend to
minority candidates who are not Black -assuming Whites harbor more
animosity toward Blacks than other racial minorities.
Recent, unpublished research by Albertson and Greenwald links implicit
attitudes with the Bradley Effect. 221 Their study (conducted before the 2008
primaries began) measured both implicit and explicit preferences by voters
for three Democratic hopefuls
Clinton, Edwards, and Obarna. When
voters were asked whom they supported, Obarna won handily, forty-two

213. William A. Cunningham et aI., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1336 (2004).
214. 10hn T. lost et aI., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL.
881,902 (2004); Brian Nosek, The Politics ofIntergroup Attitudes: Implicit Cognition and
Political Orientation, Presentation at Duke University's The Psychology of Voting and
Election Campaigns (Oct. 20-21,2006).
215. See Inna Burdein et aI., Experiments on the Automaticity of Political Beliefo and
Attitudes, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 359 (2006); Malte Friese et aI., Predicting Voting Behavior

with Implicit Attitude Measures: The 2002 German Parliamentary Election, 54
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 248,251 (2007) (finding predictive power of the IAT in the 2002
German Parliamentary election); see generally WESTEN, supra note 56, at 219-48.
216. Kam, supra note 161, at 344.
217. Id.
218. /d.
219. /d.
220. Id.
221. ScientificBlogging.com, Implicit Association Test Creator Says Political Polls
Need Better Metrics to be More Accurate, http://www.scientificblogging.comlnews_releases
limplicit_association_tesCcreatocsays_political-polls_need_better_metrics_to_be_accurate
(last visited November I, 2008).
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percent to thirty-four percent and twelve percent for Clinton and Edwards,
respectively.222 But Obama came in third, with twenty-five percent on
implicit measures, with Clinton and Edwards capturing forty-eight percent
and twenty-seven percent of the participants' support. 223 This study, while
preliminary, provides the most direct evidence that Senator Obama faces a
gap between what voters will tell pollsters and how they will vote.
Other research has explored the implicit association between the
categories of White and American in the 2008 election. 224 Devos and
colleagues found that people more easily associated Senator Clinton and
even Tony Blair with the category "American" than they did Senator
Obama. 225 In another study by Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, when
Whites and Asians were primed with images of the American flag, their
attitudes toward Democrats were not altered, but their attitudes toward
Blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically, became more
negative. 226 In fact, when primed with the American flag, eligible voters
(i.e., college students) were less inclined to vote for Senator Obama over
other candidates. 227
C. IMPLICIT ATTITUDES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

In recent years, implicit bias has been imported into legal scholarship.
The role of implicit bias in employment discrimination was advanced by
Linda Hamilton Krieger almost a decade and a half ago. In her seminal
work, Krieger presented three broad ideas. First, stereotyping is not
intent-driven but evolves from social cognition theory, which assumes
that, quite naturally, "cognitive structures and processes involved in
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves result
in stereotyping and other forms of biased intergroup judgment previously
attributed to motivational processes."m Furthermore, it is not only "bad"
people who stereotype; as part of "normal cognitive functioning," all
people categorize and stereotype natural objects as a way "to simplify the
task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in
memory.,,229
Second, stereotypes unintentionally bias people's
judgment about members of other groups. 230 Third, stereotypes are
222. ScientificBlogging.com, supra note 221.
223. Id.
224. Devos & Banaji, supra note 172.
225. Thierry Devos et aI., Is Barack Obama American Enough to be the Next
President? The Role of Racial and National Identity in American Politics, available at
http://www.rohan.sdsu.eduHdevos/thdlDevos_spsp2008.pdf.
226. Ferguson, supra note 180, at 9.
227. !d. at 8-12.
228. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1187 (1995).
229. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1188.
230. !d.
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triggered and operate outside of one's own conscious awareness. 231
Krieger, in turn, applied these principles to the area of Title VII
jurisprudence. Her contention and critique revolved around certain
assumptions that Title VII cases make about human inference and
judgment. The first erroneous assumption is that discriminatory
motive or intent drives intergroup discrimination. 232 Currently, under
Title VII, a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that purposeful or
intentional di scrimination resulted in differential treatment. 233 In the
context of race, discrimination results from the decision-maker's racial
animus toward members of plaintiff's racial group.234 Few Title VII
cases acknowledge unconscious race bias,235 whereas cases have
acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping. 236 Krieger
argues that there is a logical connection between implicit biases and
intentional discrimination in three ways. First, stereotypes bias
decision making through the conscious use of race and sex as a proxy
for some other characteristic stereotypically associated with group
membership. 231
Second, evidence of stereotyping suggests

231. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1188.
232. /d. at 1166-67.
233. See, e.g., St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,506-07 (1993) ("[The
plaintiff has] the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.") (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981)). Accord EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiff had to prove termination of employment was the result of intentional
discrimination based on plaintiffs national origin); Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802
F.2d 746, 752-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding discriminatory intent means actual motive and
cannot be presumed based upon a factual showing of less than actual motive); Smith v.
Honeywell, Inc., 735 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an individual
alleging disparate treatment has the burden of showing not only a difference in treatment,
but that he is a victim of intentional discrimination), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984);
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding disparate treatment plaintiff is
required to prove not only disparate treatment, but that such disparate treatment was caused
by purposeful or intentional discrimination).
234. See EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Merely
finding that people have been treated differently stops short of the crucial question: why
people have been treated differently."); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of S. Bend,
617 F. Supp. 1330, 1358 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("Mere conclusory allegations of discrimination
are clearly not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent."); Gomez v. Med. Coli., No. 925048, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11274, ·9 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("A plaintiff may not prevail on a
mere showing that the defendant's proffered reasons are false, but must prove a
discriminatory animus.").
235. But see EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that racial discrimination occurs where subjective employment criteria embody
racially discriminatory attitudes, even where intent is not established), cerro denied sub nom.
Inland Marine Indus. v. Houston, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
236. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Bd. of Treasurers of Keene State Coli., 604 F.2d 106, 113
n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming judgment for plaintiff in sex discrimination case because the
district court could have reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote plaintiff was
"determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against women.").
237. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1173. Cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed
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discriminatory intent if stereotypes are understood as one's
expectations about how members of a particular group should
behave. 238 Third, statements reflecting stereotyped views represent
discriminatory animus, where discrimination is seen as resulting from
prejudice where prejudice consists of "a cognitive component
(stereotypes), an affective component (aversion or dislike), and a
behavioral component (discrimination aimed at creating or enforcing
social distance).,,239
The second erroneous assumption is that unless employers harbor
discriminatory intent or motive, they will be rational actors. 240 As
such, proving discriminatory intent in the employment context is a
high hurdle to overcome. 241 Under the analytical framework established by Texas Dep 'f of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, proof of disparate treatment is evinced in
three steps. First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff presents a
prima facie case of discrimination. 242 In response, the defendant has
the burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to
justify the adverse employment action against the plaintiff. 243 Second,
the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the defendant's proffered
reason was not the "true reason" for the decision,244 but merely a
"pretext for discrimination.,,245 According to Krieger's research:
[T]he most common method of proving pretext is to show that
the employer's proffered reason is not worthy of credence
either because it appears implausible in light of data upon
which such an employment decision should have been based,
or because it appears inconsistent with decisions reached in
similar cases involving employees outside of plaintiffs
protected class. 246

under this theory are more frequently seen in the age, vis-ii-vis race, context. See, e.g.,
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) ("The employer cannot rely on age as
a proxy for an employee's remaining characteristics, such as productivity, but must instead
focus on those factors directly.").
238. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1173.
239. Id. at 1174.
240. Id. at 1167.
241. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that
"[p]roof of such discrimination is always difficult").
242. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
243. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993);
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
244. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
245. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-516; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; see also McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
246. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1179. Krieger goes on to provide examples:
(1) Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not
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The third erroneous assumption is that disparate treatment
jurisprudence accounts for the fact that race and sex categorization "may
distort perception, memory, and recall for decision-relevant events such that,
at the moment of decision, an employer may be entirely unaware of the effect of an
employee's group membership on the decision-making process.,,247 In essence,
according to Krieger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly
construes how discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental strategies
that employers use in decision making. This occurs in three ways. First, it
assumes that discrimination occurs when a decision maker refuses to
consider an individual for a particular position. 248 Further, it assumes that
the decision arises out of antipathy for that individual's social group or
because placing the individual in the position in question violates role
expectations for members of the individual's social groUp.249 Second,
disparate treatment jurisprudence assumes that stereotypes can cause
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a "proxy" for some
other job-relevant trait. 250 Third, it assumes that discrimination occurs at
the precise moment of the employer's decision making.251
Another assumption of disparate treatment jurisprudence is that
decision-makers possess adequate access to their own thoughts as to why
they will make or have made certain decisions. 252 As such, it assumes that
decision-makers are aware of the reasons they will make, or have made,
With such knowledge, well intentioned
employment decisions. 253
decision-makers comply with Title VII.254 In contrast, decision-makers
with bad intentions know when they are taking an employee's group status
into account; when challenged, they design "pretexts" to cover their
tracks. 255
Though it may not be routine for courts to analyze employment
discrimination through an unconscious bias lens, such analysis is not new.
Courts have refused to grant defendant-employers summary judgment in
Title VII cases given employers' "hidden or unconscious [discriminatory]

support the result reached by the decision-maker; (2) Evidence that the
decision-maker seemed to undervalue or ignore facts favorable to the
employee; (3) Evidence that the decision-maker made a judgment about the
plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would
reasonably support such a judgment; or (4) Evidence showing that similarly
situated Anglo employees were on occasion treated more favorably.
Krieger, supra note 228, at 1180.
247. Id. at 1167.
248. Id. at 1181-82.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1182.
251. Id. at 1183.
252. !d. at 1167.
253. Id. at 1185.
254. !d.
255. Idat 1185.

Winter 2009]

MICHELLE OBAMA

31

motives.,,256 In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted that:
Overt and blatant discrimination IS a relatively rare
phenomenon. . .. It is intentional discrimination in its covert
hidden form that now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit
intent may be extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible
individuals are conscious of their bias, and therefore likely to try to
hide it, or whether they are expressing unconscious bias through
some discretionary decision-making process. 257
Courts have similarly found that unconscious race bias 258 and gender
stereotyping 259 may be implicated under Title VII. Parks and Rachlinski's
research suggests that unconscious race bias, and to some degree gender
stereotyping, were pervasive in the 2008 presidential campaign. 260 And
such biases are analogously manifested under Title VII case law. 261

D. UNCONSCIOUS VOTER BIAS AND EVALUATION OF MICHELLE OBAMA
Given espoused societal norms of fairness and egalitarianism in the
United States, explicit racism and sexism are not likely to underlie most
citizens' attitudes about Mrs. Obama. Implicit bias research findings,
however, suggest that voters' negative attitudes about her likely arise from
unconscious attitudes about race and gender. Such unconscious bias is
evident in two ways. First, critiques of Michelle Obama provide a glimpse
into voters' attitudes toward her. Second, exit polls from the Democratic
primaries, coupled with voting behavior for Senator Clinton or Senator
Obama, provide additional indicia of such biases.
Critiques of Mrs. Obama on blogs and in website news story
comments, for example, arguably do not reflect a systematic sampling of
likely voters' attitudes about her. As a result, they are simply stray
remarks, which provide little useful insight into the pervasiveness of any

256. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. III. 1985).
257. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting Elizabeth
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII: U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of
Governors V. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1982)).
258. Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir 1993)
(holding that an employer's failure to adhere to its own set of rules invites "subjective
determinations likely to reflect unconscious racial bias ... ").
259. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
gender stereotyping includes "subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and
judgments").
260. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 46.
261. !d. at note 2, at 41-44; See, e.g., EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229,
1236 (holding that racial discrimination occurs where subjective employment criteria
embody racially discriminatory attitudes, even where intent is not established); See, e.g.,
Sweeney v. Bd. of Tr. of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 113 (sex discrimination case
affirming judgment for plaintiff because the district court reasonably concluded that the
decision not to promote plaintiff was "determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against
women").
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racially or gender-biased attitudes. In employment discrimination cases
where plaintiffs produce evidence of comments made by a non-decisionmaker or a decision-maker unrelated to the employment action to
demonstrate pretext, courts dismiss such "stray remarks.,,262 Some circuits,
however, reject the "stray remarks" doctrine. 263 Further, in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court suggested that
even where stray remarks are not made in the context of the employment
decision, they are still probative in assessing discriminatory animus. 264
Thus, stray remarks should be probative, particularly in light of people's
implicit biases. 265 In the context of elections, voters actually serve as
decision-makers and the decisions they make (Le., through voting) are
ultimately related to the critique that their decisions are race-based, genderbased, or both. As such, with regards to the 2008 election primary,
comments by voters fall outside of the stray remarks paradigm.
Here, in describing her physical features, one commentator on the
Hujjington Post indicated that Mrs. Obama was reminiscent of Zira
one
266
of the characters on Planet of the Apes.
This comment, if not a blatantly
racial attack, which it did not seem to be, is explainable by Goff and
colleagues' research on Whites' unconscious association of Blacks with
apes. 267 The use of the ape image in depicting Blacks has been held to be
probative in employment discrimination cases. 268

262. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288,
300-01 (1st Cir. 1998).
263. Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2006);
Fisher v. Pharrnacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000); Russell v. McKinney
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226-29 (5th Cir. 2000).
264. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 152·53 (2000).
265. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L.
REv. 83,96-99 (2008).
266. Posting of mcnairbo to Michelle Obama Predicts Ohio Victory, HUFFINGTON POST,
Feb. 15, 2008 http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2008/02/15/michelle-obama-predicts-o..Jl_
86896.html. (Feb. 15,2008,15:16 EDT).
267. See supra notes 140-142 and 181-188 and accompanying text.
268. See Green v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 911-12 (8th Cir.
2006) (plaintiff was called a "monkey"); Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192,
1193 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff was called a "monkey"); White v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, 375
F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[t]o suggest that a human being's physical appearance
is essentially a caricature of a jungle beast goes far beyond the unflattering; it is degrading and
humiliating in the extreme); Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 FJd 906,909 (8th Cir.
2003) (plaintiff was threatened with drawings of an ape accompanied by the phrase "aU niggers
must die"); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff was
called a "monkey''); Jeffries v. Metro-Mark. Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff was
called a "monkey"); Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597,945 F.2d 906, 910 (7th
Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs were called "porch monkeys" and "baboons"). The use of primates as a
racial slur was used to intimidate Blacks in other contexts. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d
527,531 (1st Cir. 1976) (in a school desegregation case, White students harassed Black students
by chanting "assassinate the nigger apes").
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Whites' unconscious attitudes about Mrs. Obama, however, likely go
beyond her physical appearance to her philosophical leanings. For
example, the fact that she is a Black person may be less of an issue for
some White voters than the fact that she has a strong racial identity.
Preference for greater approximation to the majority, phenotypically
speaking, happens even at the unconscious level. 269 Analogously, it may
also be the case with regards to ideology.27o In the employment context,
defendants have been held to have discriminated against Black employees
for being deemed "too ethnic" or "pro_Black.,,271
Regarding gender there may also be an unconscious underpinning to
voters' conscious expectations about what roles their First Lady can and
For example, voters may have an unconscious
should assume. 272
expectation that Mrs. Obama fit within a certain gendered paradigm,
philosophically. Being an opinionated Ivy League graduate and lawyer
may not fit these expectations. Though Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did
not speak in terms of unconscious gender stereotyping, it was clear that the
plaintiff in that case walked a tightrope, having to be masculine enough to
compete in a male-dominated environment for a promotion on the one hand
and not be too masculine on the other hand. 273
Additionally, even where critiques of Mrs. Obama have been more
substantive
e.g., questions about her patriotism
these criticisms, too,
fall within the implicit bias paradigm about race and Americanness. 274
Under Title VII, courts have held that excluding employees beyond the
bounds of patriotism, but based on race, establishes a prima facie case for
employment discrimination. 275
Finally, Democratic primary exit polling data also suggest that implicit
biases (primarily race and gender) influence voters' decisions. 276 Political
conservati vism is associated with unconscious in-group bias.217 This is
particularly true of race and is disambiguated from mere conservative
ideology.278 This should be no surprise given that "[o]ne major criterion

269. Lane, supra note 166, at 62.
270. See supra notes 143 to 144 and accompanying text.
271. Gordon v. JK.P Enter. Inc., No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at "'I, "'8 (5th Cir. April
9,2002).
272. See supra notes 129 to 136 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 43 to 55 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 172 to 180 and accompanying text.

275. Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. 04-01787, 2006 WL 889571, at "'I, *10 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 2006).
276. See app., tbls.l-2.
277. Cf Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 958 (2006).
278. Inna Burdein, Principled Conservatives or Covert Racists: Disentangling Racism and
Ideology Through Implicit Measures, (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State Univ. of
New York, Stony Brook) (on file with Hastings Women's Law Journal), available at

34

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

continually reappears in distinguishing left from right: attitudes toward
equality. The left favors greater equality, while the right inevitably sees
society as hierarchical.,,279 Nonetheless, liberalism and conservativism
should not be viewed as dichotomous categories, but rather should be
viewed on a continuum. In this way, there are relative conservatives on the
Left and relative liberals on the Right - those slightly left or right of
center. Thus, across the political spectrum, individuals may harbor racial
or gender biases. For example, despite the fact that Liberals explicitly
report greater racial egalitarianism than Conservatives,280 at the implicit
level, they both have high levels of subconscious anti-Black bias - 61.1
percent for Liberals and 73.6 percent for Conservatives.28I To gauge
political conservativism among Democratic primary voters, we used
proxies. Age, education, and socio-economic status have long predicted
political orientation, with those who are 01der,282 less educated,283 and
poorer284 being more politically conservative. As illustrated in Table 1,
those who voted for Senator Clinton over Senator Obama tended to be
older, poorer, and less educated than Senator Obama's supporters. This
does not suggest that gender and race were not simultaneously driving
forces in how Democrats cast their ballots. As previously noted, despite
the fact that racism and sexism are opposite sides of the same coin, when
analyzed simultaneously, race tends to be more of a driving force. 285

IV. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND VOTERIEMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
No empirical research has been conducted on the role of candidates'
third-party associations and individuals' attitudes and voting behavior
towards those candidates. However, it stands to reason that negative
depictions of (potential) First Ladies reflect not only upon them but upon
their spouses as well. As commentators expressly noted in discussing
Michelle Obama, "in modem politics, the marriage partnership is integral to
the quest for the presidency, as voters evaluate a candidate in light of the
relationship with his or her spouse.,,286 As such, in this section we seek to
http://dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edulbitstreamlI951143111111 100402 I 80.sbu.pdf.
279. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 40
(1998).
280. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 277.
281. !d.
282. Francis D. Glamser, The Importance of Age to Conservative Opinions: A
Multivariate Analysis, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 549, 551 (1974).
283. !d.; Jaime L. Napier & John T. Jost, The "Antidemocratic Personality'"
Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authortarianism, 64 J. Soc.
ISSUES 595, 612 (2008).
284. !d. at 612.
285. Timberlake & Estes, supra note 106.
286. Christi Parsons, Bruee Japsen & Bob Seeter, Barack's Rock, CHI. TRlB., Apr.
22,2007, at 1.
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shed light on this position by exploring the treatment of associative
discrimination under Title VII law.

A. THIRD-PARTY ASSOCIATIVE DISCRIMINA nON
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court delineated the
requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. 287 This
standard, requiring that the plaintiff be a member of a protected class, is not
uniformly easy to plead, especially when the plaintiff's claim of discrimination
is associative. 288 Third-party associative discrimination is discrimination
against individuals due to their relationship with Title VII protected class
members. This type of discrimination claim is difficult to make, because the
plaintiff is not necessarily a member of a protected class. 289 Strictly construed,
none of the Title VII categories are broad enough to protect discrimination
against third-party actors. 290 In fact, the statutory language seems to limit
claims under Title VII to instances that arise "because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,,291
Early cases dealing with third-party associative discrimination under Title
VII held that plaintiffs lacked standing. In 1973 an Alabama district court held
in Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc. that a White man who was tenninated from his
job due to his association with Black co-workers lacked standing. 292 The court
indicated that the plaintiff was "not a 'person aggrieved' within the
contemplation of the Act.,,293 In 1981, the Northern District of Georgia
decided in Adams v. Governor's Committee on Postsecondary Education that
the White plaintiff, who alleged employment discrimination for having a Black
wife, lacked standing. 294 The court relied on the rationale propounded in
Ripp.295 Two years later, in Parr v. United Family Life Insurance Co., the
Northern District of Georgia affinned its decision in Adams when it refused to
allow a White plaintiff to state a cause of action under Title VII, based on the
fact that he was married to a Black woman. 296

287. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The court held that:
The elements comprising a plaintiffs prima facie case were initially defined
as (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.
288. Mark W. Honeycutt, II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Third-party Associative
Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REv. 913 (2001).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 915.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
292. Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205,209 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
293. Id.
294. Adams v. Governor's Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., et aI., No. 80-624A,
1981 WL 27101, at "'I, "'3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3,1981).
295. Adams, No. 80-624A, 1981 WL27101, at "'I, *3.
296. Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. 83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *1, *2
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One of the first cases to sustain a cause of action for third-party
associative discrimination was the 1975 case of Whitney v. Greater New
York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists. 297 In Whitney, a White plaintiff
sued her employer after she was allegedly fired for having a social
relationship with a Black man. 298 Rejecting the Ripp analysis, the Southern
District of New York held that "the plaintiffs race was as much a factor in
the decision to fire her as that of her friend.,,299 In addition to other district
courts,300 various circuit courts have also affirmed third-party associative
standing. In 1998, the Fifth Circuit, in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., held that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
on interracial relationships. 301 In Deffenbaugh- Williams, the plaintiff was a
White female manager discriminated against because of her relationship
with a Black male sales associate. 302 A year later in Tetro v. Elliott
Popham Pontiac, Inc., Tetro (a White male employee) indicated that he
began to be treated differently by his employer once his employer noticed
that Tetro had a bi-racial daughter. 303 The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro's
discharge was within the scope of Title VII. 304 In 1996, the Tenth Circuit,
in Zeigler v. K-mart Corp., held for the plaintiff, a Black woman, who
married a White male employee and had a child by him.305 Under Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the court found that K-Mart
(N.D. Ga. June 15, 1983).
297. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
298. Id. at 1365.
299. Id. at 1367.
300. See Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207 (SD.N.Y. 1997)
(determining that White male plaintiff, who believed he was discriminated against because
he had a Black wife and bi-racial child, had third-party standing based on racial
discrimination under Title VII); Schutt v. County of Napa, No. C-94 2115 SC, 1995 WL
494588, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1995) (determining that White female plaintiff, who
believed she was discriminated against for becoming pregnant by a Black co-worker, had
third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII); Probst v. Reno, No. 94C-691, 1995 WL 613129, at *1 (N.D. lll. Oct. 17, 1995) (holding for a White male plaintiff,
who believed she was discriminated against for being romantically involved with a Black
male co-worker); Erwin v. Mister Omlet of Am., Inc., No. C-89-529-WS, 1991 WL 32248,
at *1-*3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 1991) (determining that White female plaintiff, who believed
she was discriminated against for being romantically involved with a Black co-worker, had
third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII); Gresham v. Waffle
House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding for a White female plaintiff,
who believed she was discriminated against because she had a Black husband); Holiday v.
Belle's Restaurant, 409 F. Supp. 904,905,908-09 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (determining that White
female plaintiff, who believed she was discriminated against for being married to a Black
man, had third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII).
301. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir.
1998).
302. Id. at 585.
303. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,990 (6th Cir. 1999).
304. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995.
305. Zeigler v. K-Mart Corp., No. 95-3019, 1996 WL 8021, at *4-*6 (10th Cir. Jan.
10, 1996).
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discriminated against the plaintiff based upon her interracial marriage and
ensuing pregnancy.306 When Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance
Co. reached the appellate level, Parr (a White man) sued under Title VII,
asserting that he was fired because he was married to a Black woman. 307
The Eleventh Circuit expressly repudiated Ripp and held for the plaintiff. 308

B.

WHAT THIS MEANT FOR SENATOR OBAMA'S CANDIDACY

Although associative discrimination has not received specific attention
in social science literature, the findings of social identity theory highlight
categorization processes that motivate intergroup attitudes and behavior. 309
Because individuals are assumed to have a desire to maintain a high level
of self-esteem/ lo the theory suggests that people engage in social
comparisons with others to seek a positively valued distinctiveness for the
social categories to which they belong as compared to other categories. 31 1
As individuals define themselves in terms of specific group memberships,
they come to view and evaluate themselves based on the prototypical
characteristics of the group.312 By engaging in social comparisons, people
differentiate between their in-groups and relevant out-groups and are able
to evaluate their social identities. 313 Beyond such differentiation, social
identity research also demonstrates that people tend to hold differential
expectancies about the behavior of in-group and out-group members. In
particular, they expect in-group members to display more desirable, and
fewer undesirable, behaviors than out-group members. 314 Furthermore,
they are more likely to infer negative dispositions from undesirable outgroup behaviors than from undesirable in-group behaviors and are less
likely to infer positive dispositions from desirable out-group behaviors than
from desirable in-group behaviors. 315
306. Zeigler, 1996 WL 8021, at *4-*6.
307. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (Ilth Cir.
1986).
308. Id. at 891-92.
309. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELFCATEGORIZATION TTHEORY 42-67 (1987).
310. John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-concept: A Social Cognitive
Theory oJGroup Behavior, in 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77-121 (Edward J. Lawler
ed., 1985).
311. Id.
312. See generally SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (Henri TajfeJ ed.,
1982).
313. Henri TajfeJ & John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory oj Intergroup Conflict, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33-47 (William G. Austin & Stephen
Worchel eds., 1979).
314. John W. Howard, & Myron Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memory Jor
In-Group and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J. OF PERSONAUTY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 301, 302,
308 (1980).
315. Miles Hewstone & Joseph Jaspars, Social Dimensions oj Attribution, in 2 THE
SOCIAL DIMENSION: EUR. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 379-404 (Henri Tajfel ed.,
1984).
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Such associative discrimination has been observed within political
contexts. For example, during Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential run, there
was tremendous pressure on him to reject and denounce a person who
ultimately became a litmus test for many Black leaders - Minister Louis
Farrakhan. 316 Similarly, during the current campaign, Senator Obama had to
"reject and denounce" Minister Farrakhan simply because Minister
Farrakhan made some positive remarks about Senator Obama.317 Senator
Obama has also received considerable criticism for his association with his
former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, whom some Whites perceive to be
racist and unpatriotic. 318
In light of these occurrences, Michelle Obama may have brought a
considerable amount of baggage to her husband's campaign. Given implicit
attitudes based on gender and/or race, voters may hold negative perceptions
of Mrs. Obama. However, ultimately, the person who bore the burden of
these voters' concerns was Senator Obama, as voters' attitudes about
Michelle Obama may indirectly have affected their decision to support
Senator Obama's candidacy. Optimistically, the findings of research
exploring the reputations of women who were associated with United States
Presidents suggest that this might not be the case. 319 According to
Simonton's study, the direct association between Presidents' and First
Ladies' reputations can be described as a "reflected-glory effect," as the
President's reputation was found to contribute to the First Lady's reputation
although there was no reciprocal effect. 320 Because the study's sample only
included First Ladies up to Nancy Reagan, however, we have little insight
into the effects of gender roles and attitudes post-1989 on the study's
findings. 321 Further, the influence of race might represent an important
boundary condition to the study's findings. Thus, voters' perceptions of
Michelle Obama, and the subsequent influence on Barack Obama's
candidacy, have important implications for understanding the associative
discrimination phenomenon.

316. See, e.g., Eric Pianin, Jackson Declines to Denounce Farrakhan, Despite
Statements, WASH. POST, July 2, 1984, at AS.
317. Charles Hurt, Presidential Obama The Winner of Key Debate, N.Y. POST, Feb.
27,2008, at 5.
318. Erin Aubry Kaplan, Black and Mad: The Controversy Over Obama's Pastor
Reflects White Fear ofAfrican-American Anger, BALT. SUN, Mar. 20, 2008, at A13.
319. See generally D. K. Simonton, President's Wives and First Ladies: On
Achieving Eminence within a Traditional Gender Role, 35 SEX ROLES 309, 330-32 (1996).
320. Id. at 330.
321. Id. at 313. This is significant because, quite possibly, the most controversial
First Lady was Senator Hillary Clinton and the most controversial potential First Lady was
Theresa Heinz-Kerry. And both of these women emerged on the national scene after Nancy
Reagan.
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V. CONCLUSION
Americans have made remarkable gains with regard to race and gender
issues. However, even as late as 2008, the reality of color and gender
equality and blindness is still illusive. Moreover, despite the fact that the
forty-fourth President of the United States will be a Black person and
despite Senator Clinton's historic run, the candidacies of Senators Obama
and Clinton highlight the realities of implicit bias in politics. This implicit
bias, though, is not bound by the four comers of presidential campaigning.
An appropriate corollary is the employment sphere given the analogous
decision-making processes in both. Just as courts and commentators have
begun to think about the role of the intersection of race and gender, implicit
bias, and third-party associative discrimination in Title VII cases, it seems
fitting that all three should be applicable to the 2008 presidential race with
Michelle Obama being the point of analysis.
This is where we are. A more forward looking approach, in light of
Michelle Obama, raises the question of how the inclusion of groups in
spheres where they have typically been excluded is beneficial to society.
Michelle Obama' s presence during Senator Obama' s run for the White
House and her future role as First Lady has and will go a long way towards
undermining stereotypes about Black women. For centuries, Black women
have been subject to any number of stereotypical images. Under the
mammy image, Black women have been stereotyped as loyal domestic
servants to Whites who cared for White families more than their own. 322
Under the sexual siren image, Black women have been portrayed as
sexually aggressive, uncaring whores concerned with nothing but their own
sexual satisfaction. 323 Under the welfare mother or queen image, Black
women have been seen as nothing more than "breeding animals who have
no desire to work, but are content to live off the state .... ,,324 Under the
matriarch image, they have been stereotyped as mother within the Black
"a controlling, emasculating Black woman who dictated to both
home
her children and her man their place in the home.,,325 A variant of the
latter, the angry Black woman, is "achievement-oriented, kind of nononsense, overworked, exhausted, not particularly kind or compassionate,
but very driven.,,326 Historically, positive public images of Black women
have helped to undermine these stereotypes. 327
322. Jennifer Bailey Woodard & Teresa Mastin, Black Womanhood: Essence and its
Treatment o/Stereotypicallmages 0/ Black Women, 36 J. BLACK STUDIES 264, 271 (2005).
323. Id. at 272.
324. Id. at 273.
325. Id. at 271.
326. Vanessa E. Jones, The Angry Black Woman: Tart-tongued or Driven and Nononsense, She is a Stereotype that Amuses Some and Offends Others, BOSTON GLOBE, April
20, 2008, at Fl.
327. Stevina U. Evuleocha & Steve D. Ugbah, Stereotypes, Counter-Stereotypes, and
Black Television Images in the 1990s, 13 W. J. BLACK STUDIES 197 (1989).
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Within the workplace, as well as other domains, efforts to embrace and
encourage diversity are meant to overcome the thumb on the scale that
implicit biases place against women and minorities in the present. 328
Hiring or promoting people to prominent positions that are contrary to their
stereotypes can force people to confront their implicit biases.329 Voters in
the Democratic primaries and caucuses at least had to confront the prospect
of voting for a woman or Black man, which is something they never have
had to seriously face in years past. The same was true in the general
election. Making the choice might have inspired voters who harbor
implicit biases to become aware of these biases and make efforts to reduce
them, or at least eliminate their influence on judgment. This may be
particularly so where the First Lady is a Black woman.
Current models of prejudice and stereotype reduction support the view
that the 2008 election and its result will reduce the effect of implicit biases
overall. This work reveals that what helps people avoid the influence of
implicit biases are: 1) awareness of their bias; 330 2) motivation to change
their responses because of personal values, feelings of guilt, compunction,
or self-insight; 33 I and 3) possession of the cognitive resources necessary to
develop and practice correction. 332 Regardless of the outcome, the 2008
election may have facilitated all of these factors. Exposing people to
examples that run counter to stereotypes reduces the level of implicit
invidious bias. 333 For example, showing people images of esteemed Blacks
reduces the anti-Black bias on the IAT.334 Much the same is true gender. 33S
328. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision
of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063,1067-81 (2006).
329. Jerry Kang, Professor, UCLA School of Law, Behavioral Realism: Future
History of Implicit Bias and the Law, (November 2006), available at
http://jerrykang.netlEngage.
330, Nilanjana Dasgupta, ImpliCit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. REs. 143, 157-58 (2004).
331. !d.
332. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-05 (2001); Irene V. Blair &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142,1145-1148 (1996).
333. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 332, at 806.
334. !d.
335. Social environments can undermine automatic gender stereo typic beliefs
expressed by women. Results revealed that when women are in social contexts that expose
them to female leaders, they are less likely to express automatic stereotypic beliefs about
their in-group. They also found that the frequency of exposure to women leaders (i.e.,
female faculty) mediates the long-term effect of social environments (women's college
versus coed college) on automatic gender stereotyping. Additionally, some academic
environments (e.g., classes in male-dominated disciplines like science and math) produce an
, increase in automatic stereotypic beliefs among students at the coed college but not at the
women's college. This effect was mediated by the sex of the course instructors. See
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic
Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J.
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Indeed, simply imagining people that are contrary to invidious implicit
stereotypes reduces the bias. 336 In light of this research, a prospective look
at Michelle Obama's roles as First Lady suggests that it will work to
undermine both non-Black and Black peoples' stereotypes of Black
women.

642,647-48,650-53 (2004).
336. See Irene v. Blair, et aI., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of
Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 1. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828,
830-36 (2001).
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11L26_ 17/19
47/50
57/43

18 - 24

65+

40/59
31i64

61135
41/58

30/65
62/38
65135

61/36

53/44
71124
78118

30/69

47/53
39/61
72/23

45/54

63136
31/69

52/45
66/34
10126

52148
25/12

35/64

'"~

Totals

~.

Within each category, numbers indicate percentage points won by Clinton/Ohama

:5.
til
Co

z:

~
N

800

y

Race: B

'--- 0/28

9J'3 _

Family
Income
<50K >100K

Education
Low

High
46/54
33/65

52/47
36160
31166

43/56
34/65

54146
50/50
37/60
71f23
67/29

54/46
52/48
42156

71129
53/47
39f61
64/36
54/46
37/60

58135

67122

66130

45/54

33/66
39/59

72124
53/46

42154
58142

19/17

51149

Winner

C

C
C
0
0
C

56139

50150

48149
57143

11125

25110

8117

~

0
0
C
C
0

38/61
53/47
44156
41/59
55140

34f66
35/63
47/53

~

5'
G
...,
t-..>
o
o

---

~

~
~
~

= Black; A =Asian; L = Latino(a); W = White

Sex:M ::::Male; F= Female
Age: 18-24 == youngest age group; 65+ ::: oldest age group
Education: Low

= lowest index of education (high school graduate); High = highest index of education (postgraduate study)

Winner; 0 "" Obama; C ::: Clinton
Primary/Caucus: t = Black population of 300/0 or more
(SC:::: 55, AL == 51, GA == 51, LA == 48, MD= 37, VA == 30, MS == 50,

NC::: 34)

w
"""
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Table 2. Express Gender and Race Influence in the 2008 Democratic
Primary338
Primary/
Caucus
AL Primaryi
AZ Primary
AR Primary
CA Primary*
CT Primary
DE Primary
GA Primaryi
IL Primary
MA Primary
MO Primary
NJPrimary
NM Primary
NY Primary
OK Primary
TN Primary
UT Primary
LA Primary:j:
OH Primary
TXPrimary
VT Primary
MS Primaryi
PA Primary
IN Primary
NC Primaryt
WV Primary
KY Primary
OR Primary
MT Primary
SD Primary

Gender
Influence

Race
Influence

Winner

Yes
35/62
56/40
71123
61138
41156
28/59
24/72
27/72
51144
46/50
47/49
59/40
56/42
64/19
52/42
-/38/53
59/39
52/47
42/58
36/62
59/41
53/47

No
45/53
48/43
69/28
51/42
47/50
45/52
34/65
36/62
57/41
43/54
55/42
46/51
58/39
51136
54/41
39/58
36/57
53/45
51148
38/60
39/58
54/46
51149

Yes
41/56
62/32
35/62
70/27
68/29
47/41
42/54
42/56
76119
53/43
72/25
84115
81119
56/24
59/33
69/28
39/54
60/40
60/40
37/33
29/69
72/28
59/41

No
42/56
46/46
69/28
47/47
41/57
41/56
29/69
31/67
51147
42/55
49/48
39/58
50/46
54/34
53/43
35/61
36/57
53/45
48/50
32/66
42/56
50/50
50/50

0
C
C
C
0
0
0
0
C
0
C
C
C
C
C
0
0
C
C
0
0
C
C

35/64
82/12
81116
47/53
50/47
60/40

44/54
62/30
61135
40/59
40/58
54/46

43/54
75/19
79119
55/44
65/33
67/33

42/56
65/27
63/33
38/61
37/60
52/48

0
C
C
0
0
C

338 Voters were asked, "In deciding your vote for president today, was the race of the
candidate [important]?" Supra note 337. Voters were also asked, "In deciding your vote for
president today, was the gender of the candidate [important]?" Supra note 337.

